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Neurophysiological studies of decision making have
primarily focused on decisions about information
that is stable over time. However, during natural
behavior, animals make decisions in a constantly
changing environment. To investigate the neural
mechanisms of such dynamic choices, we recorded
activity in dorsal premotor (PMd) and primary motor
cortex (M1) while monkeys performed a two-choice
reaching task in which sensory information about
the correct choice was changing within each trial
and the decision could be made at any time. During
deliberation, activity in both areas did not integrate
sensory information but instead tracked it and
combined it with a growing urgency signal. Approxi-
mately 280 ms before movement onset, PMd activity
tuned to the selected target reached a consistent
peak while M1 activity tuned to the unselected target
was suppressed. We propose that this reflects the
resolution of a competition between the potential
responses and constitutes the volitional commitment
to an action choice.
INTRODUCTION
When buying a house, one is motivated to first collect relevant
information and then take time to think about the best choice.
Because careful deliberation is important to human behavior,
studies of the neural mechanisms of decision making have
largely focused on scenarios in which subjects decide about
information that is stable over time. For example, perceptual
decisions are usually studied using stimuli whose informational
content is constant in each trial (Britten et al., 1992; Romo
et al., 2004), leading to models of deliberation as the integration
of sensory evidence to a threshold (Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Ratcliff, 1978). Likewise, studies of value-based decisions focus
on conditions in which the value of options is stable (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011; Platt and Glimcher, 1999), leading to serial
models in which the costs and benefits are converted into a
‘‘common currency,’’ the decision is made, and the chosen ac-tion is then prepared (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). However, the
vertebrate brain evolved to guide behavior in a dynamic world,
in which decisions are made during ongoing activity, action
options and their payoffs are continuously changing, and ani-
mals are free to decide when to take time to deliberate and
when to commit quickly to their current best guess. Here, we
investigate such ‘‘embodied’’ decisions and ask which conclu-
sions from static scenarios generalize to real-time dynamic
decisions.
In particular, studies of static tasks have suggested that the
brain gradually integrates repeated samples of the stimulus,
causing neural activity to build up to a threshold (Gold and Shad-
len, 2007; Ratcliff, 1978). However, if the sensory information can
suddenly change, such a process is suboptimal, because inte-
grators are sluggish to respond to changes in input. Recent
human studies of dynamic tasks have suggested that instead
of integrating the sensory state, the brain quickly tracks it, and
activity buildup is caused by a growing urgency to act (Cisek
et al., 2009; Thura et al., 2012). These models can only be distin-
guished with dynamic tasks, because they make identical
predictions for any static task, at both the behavioral and neural
level.
Furthermore, many neurophysiological studies have shown
that decision making influences activity in the sensorimotor
system (Gold and Shadlen, 2000; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sal-
inas and Romo, 1998;Wallis andMiller, 2003). In particular, when
animals are faced with multiple response options, the brain
represents them in parallel within sensorimotor regions (Bau-
mann et al., 2009; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005; McPeek et al.,
2003), and these representations are modulated by decision
variables (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004;
Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002;
Yang and Shadlen, 2007). For example, information for deciding
between manual actions influences neural activity in premotor
and parietal regions (Herna´ndez et al., 2010; Klaes et al., 2011;
Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011), modulates corticospinal excit-
ability (Klein-Flu¨gge and Bestmann, 2012; Michelet et al., 2010),
and even influences reflexes (Selen et al., 2012). Such results
have led to the proposal that decisions between actions involve
processes within the sensorimotor system (Cisek, 2007; Herna´n-
dez et al., 2010; Shadlen et al., 2008). However, it is also possible
that they simply reflect information that spills in from upstream
regions that are actually responsible for deliberation and
commitment. To establish whether the sensorimotor systemNeuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1401
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Figure 1. Task and Behavior
(A) The token task (see text).
(B) Temporal profile (thick gray line) of the probability that a given target is correct, computed using Equation 1. The vertical, dashed red line indicates the
estimated time of the decision (see text), allowing estimation of the success probability at that moment (horizontal, dashed red line).
(C) Profiles of success probability of one easy (blue), one ambiguous (green), and one misleading trial (red). A trial is considered easy if the SP exceeds 0.6 after
two token jumps and 0.75 after five. A trial is ambiguous if SP is 0.5 after two jumps, between 0.4 and 0.65 after three, and then between 0.55 and 0.66 after five
and seven jumps. A trial is misleading if SP is below 0.4 after three jumps.
(D) Distributions of decision durations in easy (blue), ambiguous (green), and misleading (red) trials for monkey S (top) and Z (bottom). Shaded regions indicate
error trials. Vertical dotted lines indicate the mean (in ms) for each trial type.
(E) Cumulative distributions of success probabilities at decision time in the same trial types. Vertical dotted lines indicate mean success probability.
(F) Mean (±SE) of the estimated confidence (SumLogLR) at which the decision was made, averaged across all trials grouped as a function of decision duration.
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortexplays an active role in deliberation, neural activity must be exam-
ined well before commitment is made, and this can be accom-
plished with dynamic tasks.
Here, we investigate these questions through neurophysiolog-
ical recordings in the dorsal premotor (PMd) and primary motor
cortex (M1) of monkeys trained to perform two reaching tasks.
In the ‘‘tokens’’ task (Figure 1A), monkeys watch a set of 15
tokens jumping every 200 ms from a central target to one of
two peripheral targets and must guess which target will ulti-
mately receive the majority of the tokens. Importantly, the deci-1402 Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.sion can be taken at any time, and when a target is reached, the
token jumps accelerate, allowing the monkey to save time by
taking an early guess. In the ‘‘delayed response’’ (DR) task,
only a single peripheral target is presented, and the monkey
must withhold movement until the 15 tokens jump into the target
simultaneously (GO signal).
Our paradigm has two critical properties. First, the sensory
evidence in the tokens task is continuously changing, allowing
us to dissociate different models of how sensory information is
treated. Second, in the tokens task, the monkeys are free to
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortexrespond at any time, allowing us to distinguish processes related
to deliberation from those related to commitment. In particular,
by comparing activity during the tokens task with activity during
the DR task, in which both the choice and its timing are externally
instructed, we can identify the neural phenomena specifically
associated with volitional commitment to action.
RESULTS
The Decision Criterion Decreases over Time
In the tokens task, monkeys’ success rate varied between
64%–87% (mean: 77%; SD: 5%, SE: 0.5%). To analyze how
behavior depended upon the specific pattern of token jumps in
each trial, we first estimated the total sensory and motor delays
using the mean reaction time (mRT) from the DR task (Monkey S:
291 ± 40 ms; Monkey Z: 335 ± 93 ms) and then subtracted this
from the reaction time (RT) in the tokens task to estimate the
decision time (DT) (Figure 1B). Next, we estimated the success
probability at decision time (SPD) using Equation 1 below. We
compared these variables in three trial types: easy, ambiguous,
and misleading (Figure 1C), classified post hoc from the fully
random trials. As expected, both monkeys made decisions
significantly earlier in easy than in ambiguous or misleading trials
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov [KS] test, p < 0.01) (Figure 1D). They also
made decisions at a significantly lower level of success probabil-
ity in ambiguous and misleading trials than in easy trials (KS test,
p < 0.05) (Figure 1E). This is consistent with the hypothesis that
to solve the task, monkeys use an accuracy criterion that de-
creases over time. To test this across all trials, we grouped
data according to the number of tokens that moved before
DT and calculated an estimate of the accuracy criterion (or
‘‘confidence’’) for the selected target at that time. This estimate
was based on the sum of the log likelihood ratios of individual
token jumps (SumLogLR; see Experimental Procedures), which
is related to the difference in the number of tokens in the two
targets. The result is shown in Figure 1F. Except for fast guesses
(<1 s), there is a trend for decisions to be made at a lower level of
accuracy as time passes. This demonstrates that both monkeys
use a similar strategy as humans to solve the task (Cisek et al.,
2009)—they decrease their accuracy criterion over time. Previ-
ous studies have suggested that this can be implemented by
combining sensory information with a growing ‘‘urgency signal’’
(Churchland et al., 2008; Cisek et al., 2009; Standage et al., 2011;
Thura et al., 2012).
Neural Activity in PMd and M1 Reflects the Time Course
of Sensory Evidence
While monkeys performed the tokens task, neural activity
was recorded from 178 cells in the arm area of PMd (135 in
monkey S) and 74 cells in M1 (55 in monkey S) excluding the
most caudal region in the central sulcus (Figure S1 available
online). Among these, 99 cells (68 in PMd and 31 in M1) had a
significant directional preference before DT (see Experimental
Procedures) and thus reliably predicted whether an arm move-
ment would be made toward or away from the cell’s preferred
target (PT).
Figure 2A shows the activity of an example PMd neuron,
aligned on the start of token jumps and plotted until 300 msbefore movement onset, during easy, ambiguous, and
misleading trials in which the monkey chose the cell’s PT or
the opposite target (OT). In easy trials, activity strongly and
quickly increases when the monkey selects the PT and is quickly
suppressed when the OT is chosen. In ambiguous trials, activity
fluctuates and gradually increases during the first seven token
jumps (1.4 s), and the cell discriminates between PT and OT
only late in the trial. The pattern of activity is again very different
in misleading trials. When the PT is ultimately selected, activity is
initially low while the first few tokens favor the OT and later
switches to predict the PT choice. In contrast, in OT trials the
early activity is strong, while tokens favor the PT, and later
decreases.
Interestingly, we found very similar phenomena in M1, as
shown in Figure 2B for an example cell. Like the PMd cell in
Figure 2A, this M1 neuron quickly reflected the choice in easy
trials, fluctuated during ambiguous trials, and reflected the
switch of evidence in misleading trials.
Figure 2C illustrates the average activity of all 68 PMd and
31M1 decision-related neurons. The top panel shows the profile
of success probability for each cell’s PT for easy (blue), ambig-
uous (green), and misleading (red) trials in which the monkey
correctly chose the PT (solid) or OT (dashed). Below that, we
show the average neural activity of the 68 PMd and 31 M1 cells
aligned on the first token jump and plotted until 300 ms before
movement initiation (diamonds) during those same trials. About
150 ms after the first token jump, activity increases or decreases
in a manner that reflects the sensory evidence and the monkey’s
ultimate choice, especially in PMd. In addition to the influence
of the changing sensory evidence, there is a trend for activity
to increase over time, and this is especially pronounced in M1.
To further quantify these observations, we calculated the
latency at which activity discriminates between PT and OT for
all PMd and M1 decision-related cells in easy or ambiguous
trials. The mean discrimination time was significantly shorter in
easy than in ambiguous trials both in PMd (280 versus 624 ms;
KS test; p < 0.01) and in M1 (341 versus 807 ms; KS test; p <
0.01). Moreover, in both easy and ambiguous trials, discrimina-
tion times were shorter in PMd than in M1, although this did
not reach significance (KS test; p > 0.05).
To quantify the effect of sensory evidence on neural activity
across all trials (not just the three types shown in Figure 2), we
measured each cell’s firing rate in successive 200 ms epochs
following the first token jump. We then plotted this as a function
of the sensory evidence (SumLogLR) present during the previous
token jump (to allow for sensory delays). The result for example
PMd and M1 cells is shown in Figures 3A and 3C, respectively.
Both neurons exhibited a clear modulation of activity as a func-
tion of the evidence, increasing their firing rate as the evidence in
favor of their PT increased (Spearman’s rank test; mean r = 0.93
for the PMd neuron and 0.75 for the M1 neuron). Moreover, this
relationship changed as time was passing. In particular, both the
baseline and the slope (calculated at the equal evidence
point; vertical dashed line) tended to grow over time. These
effects also held at the population level in both PMd and M1
(Figures 3B and 3D). Notably, at the population level, the in-
crease of activity over time was primarily due to a baseline shift
(Figure S2).Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1403
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Figure 2. Neural Activity Tracks the Changing Evidence
(A) Response of a decision-related PMd neuron in the tokens task during easy (left), ambiguous (middle), andmisleading (right) trials in which themonkey correctly
chose the cell’s PT (colored) or OT (gray). Activity is aligned on the first token jump (squares) and truncated 300 ms before movement onset (diamonds) to avoid
averaging artifacts. Rasters are sorted by decision duration.
(B) Same as A for an example M1 neuron.
(C) Top shows the success probability of the PT during easy (blue), ambiguous (green), and misleading (red) trials, in which the monkey correctly chose the PT
(solid lines) or OT (dotted lines). Middle shows the average activity of 68 spatially tuned PMd neurons during those same trials. Bottom shows the average activity
of 31 spatially tuned M1 cells.
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor CortexPMd and M1 Track the State of Sensory Information
without Integrating It
The above results raise the question of what computational
mechanism transforms sensory information into neural activity
and what is responsible for the activity buildup. It has been
suggested that during perceptual discrimination, such as
deciding about the direction of noisy motion, the sensory signal
is integrated over time by repeatedly resampling the stimulus
(Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Does a similar
mechanism operate during the tokens task? In particular, does
the brain temporally integrate the state of the sensory informa-
tion about which the decision is made (i.e., the distribution of
tokens), or does it simply track that sensory state? To distinguish1404 Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.between these two mechanisms, we examined additional trial
types, classified post hoc from the fully random set. For
example, during ‘‘bias-up/down’’ (BUD) trials (Figure 4A, top,
green line) the first three tokens move to the PT, then the next
two move toward the OT, and then the rest of the trial resembles
an easy trial toward the PT (which is the correct target). In
contrast, during ‘‘bias-down/up’’ (BDU) trials, the first two tokens
move to the OT and the next three to the PT, and the rest of the
trial is similar to BUD. Comparison between these two trial types
is critical, because if the sensory state is integrated, then after
the fifth token neural activity related to the PT will be higher in
BUD than in BDU trials (because an integrator retains a ‘‘mem-
ory’’ of previous states). In contrast, if the sensory state is simply
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Figure 3. Evolution of the Relationship
between Neural Firing and Sensory Evidence
(A) Analysis for one example PMd neuron. Each line
illustrates the relationship between the SumLogLR
with respect to the PT and the mean neural activity
calculated 200 ms later in a 200 ms epoch, color
coded from the darkest (first token jump) to the
lightest. Only epochs preceding our estimate of DT
are included.
(B) Same analysis averaged across 68 PMd cells.
(C) Same as (A) for an example M1 cell.
(D) Same analysis averaged across 31 M1 cells.
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortextracked, then one would not predict a significant difference
between the trial types.
Figure 4A illustrates the activity of one PMd neuron recorded
during BUD and BDU trials. Importantly, we include only trials
in which the monkey made decisions after the initial bias
(>800 ms) and truncate activity 300 ms before movement onset.
About 200 ms after the first token jump, activity begins to reflect
the bias in the two trial types, becoming stronger in BUD than
BDU trials. After 800 ms, as sensory evidence converges in
both trials, neural activity likewise becomes similar. Therefore,
this neuron did not integrate the sensory state during the bias,
but instead tracked it quickly (note the rapid increase of activity
after 800ms inBDU trials, clearly visible in the rasters). Thisobser-
vation holds true when activity is averaged across PMd and M1
cells (Figure 4B). To test whether this effect is robust across indi-
vidual cells, we compared themean activity of each PMd andM1
decision-related cell in BUD and BDU trials in two epochs: during
and after the bias. As predicted by both mechanisms, during the
bias, the response is usually stronger in BUD than BDU trials.
However, after the bias, most of the cells no longer discharge
differently in the two trial types, consistentwith a system that sim-
ply tracks the sensory state (Figures 4C and 4D).
The integration and tracking mechanisms also make very
distinct predictions at a behavioral level. In particular, integrationNeuron 81, 1401–141predicts faster decisions in BUD than BDU
trials, whereas tracking predicts no differ-
ence. In agreement with the latter, we
found no statistical difference between
decision durations in BUD versus BDU
trials in both monkeys (Figure 5A, top
row). Similar analyses on two other pairs
of trial types (Figure 5A,middle and bottom
rows) yielded the same conclusion—that
choices were not biased by the early
evidence, consistent with fast tracking of
the sensory state and not with integration.
In Figure S3 we show that neural activity in
both PMd and M1 also tracks the sensory
state in these trial types and exhibits no
memory of the sensory state after the initial
bias has ended.
The observations above suggest that
the sensory information is quickly tracked,
perhaps through a low-pass filter with avery short time window (i.e., less than the duration between
two token jumps [200 ms]). To test this explicitly, we computed
the mean neural activity during two 200 ms epochs, from 200–
400 ms and from 400–600 ms after the first token jump, and
sorted trials according to the pattern of the two first token jumps:
in step-for trials, the first token jumps to the cells’ PT, and the
second token jumps to the OT. In step-against trials, this pattern
is reversed. Accounting for sensory delays, the first epoch of
analysis reflects the consequences of the first token jump. Com-
parison between step-for and step-against trials shows that
activity in PMd is significantly higher (KS test; p < 0.05) and
shows a similar trend in M1 during that first epoch in step-for
than in step-against trials (Figure 5B). However, 200 ms later in
the trial, activity is similar between the two conditions, in agree-
ment with fast tracking of sensory information.
PMd and M1 Activity Signals the Commitment to a
Decision
Becausemonkeys are allowed tomake their decision at any time
during the tokens task, we can examine cortical activity for the
neural signature of themoment at which commitment to a choice
is made. To this end, we aligned activity on movement onset, as
shown on Figures 6A and 6B, for one PMd and one M1 neuron.
Note that approximately 300 ms before the monkey chooses the6, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1405
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Figure 4. Neural Activity Does Not Integrate the Sensory State
(A) Top shows the success probability with respect to PT during bias-up/down (green) and bias-down/up trials (magenta). Bottom shows the activity of a PMd
neuron during the two trial types. Only trials in which DTR800 ms are included.
(B) Top shows the mean success probability during bias-up/down (green) and bias-down/up trials (magenta). Middle shows the average activity of 68 decision-
related PMd neurons during the two trial types. Bottom shows the average activity of 31 M1 neurons.
(C) Comparison of mean neural activity (±SE) of 68 PMd (top) and 31 M1 neurons (bottom) recorded during bias-up/down versus bias-down/up trials from 600–
800 ms after the first token jump (left shaded area in [B]). Colored crosses illustrate neurons with a significant modulation of activity (green indicates stronger
activity in bias-up/down; magenta indicates stronger activity in bias-down/up). Percentages denote the proportion of significantly modulated cells.
(D) Same as (C), but showing activity from 900–1,100 ms after the first token jump (right shaded area in [B]).
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortexcell’s PT, there is a clear peak of activity in both cells, and the
amplitude and timing of this peak are similar across the different
trial types. As shown in Figure S4, this phenomenon exists at the
level of individual trials and is not an artifact of averaging over
trials of different lengths. It is also not related to saccades:
although analysis of oculomotor behavior in our task will be
described in a future publication, it is important to mention
here that in most trials (74%–79%), the monkeys were already
fixating the chosen target well before the peak in PMd activity.
Figure 6C shows the average activity of the 68 PMd and 31M1
neurons aligned on movement onset. In both areas, neural activ-
ity related to the PT shows a striking characteristic regardless of
the trial type: between the start of token jumps and movement
onset, activity first shows the influence of the mounting sensory
evidence, then reaches a peak, and finally decreases prior to
movement onset. The approximate timing of that peak (vertical1406 Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.gray line in Figure 6C) as well as its amplitude is very similar
across trial types, appearing earlier in PMd than in M1. Impor-
tantly, at approximately the same time, activity in M1 related to
the unselected OT target becomes rapidly suppressed. This is
seen most clearly in ambiguous and misleading trials, in which
there was some evidence favoring the OT choice. To further
quantify the timing of these phenomena, we first averaged the
activity of PMd and M1 neurons across all trials in which the
PT was chosen and detected the peak firing rate across 10 ms
bins. In PMd, this peak was reached 280 ms before movement
onset, whereas in M1 it occurred 140 ms later (Figures 7A and
7D, left). To assess the robustness of this observation, we also
calculated the peak timing for each cell separately and
computed its mean and median latency across the population
(Figures 7A and 7D, right). Except for a few cells whose
maximum activity occurs very early, there is a clear trend for
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A  Figure 5. The Sensory State Is QuicklyTracked
(A) Left shows the following six trials for testing
integration versus tracking: bias-up/down (green)
and bias-down/up (magenta), long bias-for (blue),
long bias-against (red), short bias-for (black), and
short bias-against (gray). Right shows the cumula-
tive DT distributions in these six trial types, including
only trials in which the decision was made after the
bias (gray areas in the left panel).
(B) Left shows step-for trials (black), in which the
first token jumps to the PT and the second to theOT,
and step-against trials (red), in which the pattern is
reversed. Right shows average (±SE) neural activity
in PMd and M1 from 200–400 ms and 400–600 ms
after the first token jump.
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortexthe peak to occur approximately 260ms before movement onset
in PMd and 179ms inM1. Next, we sought to determine whether
the latencies of neural activity peaks correlate with RTs and are
consistent across trial types. For each cell, we calculated the
mean latency of the peak in easy and misleading trials and
then plotted these against the RT in those same trials (Figures
7B and 7E). In almost all PMd and M1 neurons, there is a strong
relationship with a slope near unity, suggesting that regardless of
the history of sensory information during a trial, the timing of PMd
and M1 peaks is consistent relative to movement initiation.
Here, we will use the earliest of these latency values as our
estimate of the timing of commitment: 280 ms before movement
onset. Figure 7C shows that the amplitude of the PMd activity at
this moment in PT trials is very consistent across trial types,
although there is a slight trend for it to be lower in easy trials,
in which decisions are shorter.
Most interestingly, at this same moment, M1 activity tuned to
the unselected target becomes rapidly suppressed (Figure 6C).
For each PMd and M1 cell, we quantified the timing of this
suppression by examining how activity changed between twoNeuron 81, 1401–141consecutive 50 ms bins at different
latencies with respect to movement onset
(see Figure S5). The distribution of the
time of the greatest change between bins
is quite broad for PMd, suggesting that
there is no specificmoment of suppression
of cells tuned to the unselected target. In
M1, however, the distribution is narrower,
and the mean timing across cells
(275 ms) roughly corresponds to our esti-
mate of commitment time.
Comparison of Volitional
Commitment versus Instructed
Movement
In the tokens task, monkeys are free to
decide both which target to choose and
the time at which they commit to that
choice. Figures 6 and 7 suggest that the
neural peak in PMd and suppression in
M1 signals this moment of free commit-ment. However, are these phenomena simply the correlates of
movement initiation? To address this, we examined the activity
of the same cells during the DR task, in which both the target
and the time to respond are externally instructed. Most of the
cells recorded in the tokens task (58/68 in PMd; 25/31 in M1)
were also recorded in the DR task. Using the same PT and OT
as in the tokens task, we found that 30/58 PMd cells tuned in
the tokens task before DT were also significantly tuned in the
DR task (for the same targets) during the last 200 ms before
the GO signal. Figures 8A and 8B illustrate the activity of one
of these tuned cells. Likewise, most M1 cells (18/25) tuned in
the tokens task were also tuned in the DR task (e.g., Figures
8E and 8F). In both cells, activity increased shortly after target
onset (160ms) and then stabilized well before the GO signal.
Notably, at the time of the GO signal there was no obvious
change in neural activity, which began to decrease only just
before movement onset. This observation held true at the popu-
lation level, as shown in Figures 8C and 8G, for the 30 PMd cells
significantly tuned in the delayed reach (DR) task, the 28 other
PMd cells, as well as the 18 tuned M1 cells. Note that when6, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1407
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Figure 6. Neural Correlates of the Moment of Commitment
(A) Response of a tuned PMd neuron in easy (left), ambiguous (middle), and misleading (right) trials. Same convention as in Figure 2A except that here activity is
aligned on movement onset (diamonds). Triangles mark movement offset.
(B) Same as (A) for an example M1 neuron.
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Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortexactivity is aligned on the GO signal (middle plots of [A], [C], [E],
and [G]), there is no clear change in neural activity in any of the
cell groups. In contrast, in the tokens task all three groups exhibit
a clear peak well before movement onset.
To further test whether the activity peak before movement is
particular to volitional commitment as opposed to movement
initiation, we also examined a group of cells in M1 that were
more closely related to the kinematic or dynamic aspects of
themovement itself (Kalaska et al., 1989). In particular, we chose
cells (n = 19) whose predecision activity in the tokens task did not
correlate with success probability, but whose premovement
activity in the tokens task was significantly correlated with
movement speed. None of these were among the 31 cells
described above. In contrast to the decision-related cells, in1408 Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.both tasks these cells exhibit a similar peak of activity shortly
before movement onset (tokens task: 100 ms; DR task:
40 ms) and do not exhibit any particular response in the tokens
task at our estimated moment of commitment (Figure S6). We
propose that the activation of such cells is what determines
movement initiation, but the PMd peak that occurs about
180 ms earlier is related to volitional commitment.
In summary, the PMd and M1 cells described here appear
to be involved in both deliberation and commitment. These
processes are most clearly dissociable in misleading trials,
which include an initial bias toward thewrong target that is visible
in neural activity (Figure 2). If the monkey correctly withholds
commitment at this time, activity related to the misleading target
should not exceed the level of activity reached at commitment
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Figure 7. Timing and Robustness of the Neural Activity Peak
(A) Left shows average activity of the 68 decision-related PMd cells across all trials (in 10ms bins) for PT (solid) and OT choices (dotted). The peak of the average
PT-related activity is indicated and its timing defined relative to movement onset. Right shows cumulative distribution of PT- (solid) and OT- related (dotted) peak
activity timing relative to movement onset, calculated individually in each of the 68 PMd cells.
(B) Relationship between latencies of peak activity of the 68 PMd cells and reaction time. For each cell (black lines), themean peak activity latencies are calculated
in easy (blue) and misleading (red) trials for the cell’s PT and plotted against the mean RTs in these same trials. The inset shows the distribution of slopes of the
black lines (dashed line is unity slope).
(C) Comparison of themean firing rate ±SE at commitment time (280ms beforemovement onset) of each of the 68 PMd cells during easy-versus-ambiguous (left),
easy-versus-misleading (middle), and ambiguous-versus-misleading trials (right). Colored crosses illustrate neurons for which the difference is significant (KS
test, p < 0.05). Percentages denote the proportion of neurons whose activity is significantly different in each comparison.
(D) Same as (A) for a population of 31 decision-related M1 neurons.
(E) Same as (B) for the 31 M1 neurons.
(F) Same as (C) for the 31 M1 cells (note that the mean firing rate ±SE of M1 cells is calculated 280 ms before movement onset).
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortextime. To test this, we performed an additional analysis of each
cell (recorded during at least four trials) to see if neural activity
during the bias ever reaches a level higher than that reached at
commitment (Figure S7). Results show that, in both PMd and
M1, there is a clear trend for misleading-related activity to be
weaker than correct-target-related activity around decision
commitment. We also show that when the monkey makes an
error during misleading trials, the activity tends to be higher
than in correct trials, suggesting that the errors occur when neu-
ral activity is strong enough to reach the level for commitment,
leading the monkey to make an overly hasty guess.
DISCUSSION
Decisions about action are arguably the most fundamental kinds
of decisions that animals face in the natural world. For suchdecisions, the choices themselves are defined by the immediate
environment and are constantly changing during ongoing
activity. This motivates the hypothesis that multiple potential
actions are specified simultaneously and compete against
each other within the sensorimotor system (Cisek, 2007) and
that this competition is biased by a continuous flow of sensory
information (Coles et al., 1985; Kim and Shadlen, 1999). Our
results support this hypothesis and suggest a mechanism for
how sensory information brings the system to commit to one
action versus another. In particular, we show that information
pertinent to reach selection is continuously influencing activity
in reach-related regions of PMd and M1 (Figures 2–5). This in-
formation is combined with a nonspecific urgency signal that
gradually builds up tension between the options until one of
them gets strong enough to suppress the other (Figures 6
and 7). We propose that this moment, when the competitionNeuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1409
020
40
60
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
PMd, cell #144
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
0
10
20
0 0.2 0.4 -0.6 -0.2 0 0.2
0
20
40
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
M1, cell #272
0
10
20
30
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
-1.0 0 1.0
0
10
20
30
0 0.2 0.4
Time from target onset (s)
-0.2 0 0.2
Movement onset (s)
0
10
20
30
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
-1.0 0
Time from movement onset (s)
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
0 0.2 0.4 -0.6 -0.2 0 0.2
0 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0 0.2
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
10
20
30
0
-1.0 0
0
10
20
30
40
50
A
ct
iv
ity
 (H
z)
-1.0 0 1.0
PMd,  population
M1, population
-0.5 0 0.5
-0.2 0 0.2
GO (s)
-0.5 0 0.5
-0.2 0 0.2
A B
C D
E F
G H
-2.0
-2.0
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(A) Activity of a PMd decision-related neuron during the delayed reach task, in trials to the PT (blue) or OT (gray), aligned on target onset (left), GO signal (middle),
and movement onset (right).
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(legend continued on next page)
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Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortexbetween actions is resolved within themotor system, constitutes
the voluntary commitment to an action choice.
The proposal that the motor system is involved in decision
making is based on the observation that decision-related vari-
ables modulate activity in many regions implicated in sensori-
motor control (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Cisek and Kalaska,
2005; Gold and Shadlen, 2000; Platt andGlimcher, 1999; Salinas
and Romo, 1998; Wallis and Miller, 2003). However, the pres-
ence of such modulation does not prove that the motor system
participates in the decision process, because it could be argued
that the modulation is related to other variables such as arousal
(Leathers and Olson, 2012; Roesch and Olson, 2003) or is merely
reflecting decision-making processes occurring upstream.
Padoa-Schioppa (2011) suggests that to truly establish that
motor regions contribute to the decision process, it is necessary
to show that (a) decision-related activity is indeed within the
motor system, (b) it reflects subjective variables, and (c) it is
not downstream of the decision process. Here, we satisfy these
criteria by showing neural correlates of deliberation within M1
(criterion a), reflecting not just the sensory information but also
the animal’s subjective urgency to act (criterion b), and occurring
prior to the moment of commitment (criterion c). Because our
recordings were limited to PMd and M1, it is conceivable
that another region, such as lateral or medial prefrontal cortex
(PFC), may be the site of commitment and simply relay its results
downstream. However, it is hard to imagine neural events that
are more consistent across conditions than what we observed
in PMd and M1. Indeed, preliminary recordings in dorsolateral
PFC showed that the peak of activity in that region does not
remain consistent across easy, ambiguous, andmisleading trials
in terms of its timing and amplitude (Thura and Cisek, 2010). We
thus conclude that PMd and M1 are part of the circuit respon-
sible for the commitment to a choice between reaching actions.
Continuous Flow and Competition between Actions in
Premotor and Motor Cortex
Our results demonstrate that the sensory information provided
by the token movements continuously influences neural activity
in PMd and even M1. In particular, Figure 2 shows that neural
activity in both regions quickly predicts the choice in trials clas-
sified as easy, remains uncommitted longer in ambiguous trials,
and reflects when the bias switches in misleading trials. These
phenomena are clearer in PMd than in M1, and in both regions
there is an overall tendency for activity to increase over time. In
Figure 3 we show that similar results hold across all trials and
that neural activity in both regions appears to be a gradually ris-
ing sigmoidal function of the log evidence for a choice.
Many studies have shown that information pertinent to deci-
sions can influence the sensorimotor system (for reviews, see
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Glimcher, 2003; Gold and Shadlen,
2007; Herna´ndez et al., 2010). For example, electromyographic
responses to transcranial magnetic stimulation of M1 correlate(D) Average activity of the same PMd neurons during easy trials in the tokens tas
(E) Same as (A) for an example M1 neuron.
(F) Same as (B) for the same M1 neuron as (E).
(G) Same as (C) for 18 M1 neurons tuned in the DR task.
(H) Same as (D) for the same 18 M1 neurons.with the potential value of movements (Klein-Flu¨gge and Best-
mann, 2012) and reflect when subjects change their mind
between conflicting choices (Michelet et al., 2010). Even at the
periphery, reflex gains change with the evidence in favor of a
given response (Selen et al., 2012), demonstrating a continuous
flow of sensory information into the motor system (Coles et al.,
1985). The influence of decision variables on neural activity is
well-documented in many parts of the oculomotor (Platt and
Glimcher, 1999; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002) and reaching
system (Donner et al., 2009; Klaes et al., 2011; Pastor-Bernier
and Cisek, 2011; Romo et al., 2004). For example, PMd cells
appear to engage in a biased competition between potential
actions represented in a sensorimotor map (Pastor-Bernier and
Cisek, 2011), and the same cells continue to reflect when a
monkey changes his mind even after movement onset (Pastor-
Bernier et al., 2012).
Here, we characterize how the bias between potential actions
unfolds over time. Although the bias is surely subject tomany fac-
tors, in our experimentwecanclearly identify two: the evidence in
favor of each option and the growing urgency to act. This finding
was predicted by a previous study with humans (Cisek et al.,
2009), which showed that behavior in the tokens task could be
explained by a model (‘‘urgency-gating’’) in which a filtered esti-
mate of sensory evidence was combined with a growing urgency
signal. Our present results with monkeys are in good agreement
with that study. In particular, decisions are made more quickly in
easy than in ambiguous trials but at a higher level of success
probability (Figures 1D and 1E), DTs are similar in any tested
pair of trial types that differ only in the initial sensory state (Fig-
ure 5A), and the overall criterion of information for committing
to a choice decreases over time (Figure 1F). Furthermore, here
we confirm that evidence and urgency influence the time course
of activity in directionally tuned PMd and M1 neurons, at both a
single-cell and population level (Figures 2 and 3).
Importantly, in a human study using the tokens task (Cisek et
al., 2009) as well as the present study, the sensory information
was not integrated over time, as predicted by the widely
accepted drift-diffusion model (Mazurek et al., 2003; Ratcliff,
1978). Any integrator predicts that even after the state of sensory
information became identical in two trials, neural activity would
continue to reflect the within-trial history of that state. However,
here we saw no effects of within-trial history differences (Figures
4 and 5), as if the sensory information was not integrated but
instead simply low-pass filtered with a short time constant
(less than 200 ms) (Figure 5B). Although a leaky integrator (Usher
and McClelland, 2001) could potentially explain this result, the
leak would have to be so strong that the time constant of the
system would be very short, and it would effectively be equiva-
lent to a low-pass filter.
It is possible that fast tracking of sensory information is
specific to the tokens task but that the brain integrates informa-
tion with a longer time constant when the stimulus is noisy ork.
Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1411
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recent study using a variant of the classic motion discrimination
task in which the coherence was changing during each trial
(Thura et al., 2012) found results similar to those reported here,
inconsistent with a long-time constant of integration. Indeed,
slow integration does not make good sense during natural
behavior (Chittka et al., 2009), because it is too sluggish to
respond to sudden changes. It is more useful for the brain
to emphasize only novel information, thus remaining sensitive
to the current sensory state without integrating redundant
samples. Furthermore, we have shown that a decreasing deci-
sion criterion (Figure 1F), which may be implemented using an
urgency signal, yields a higher reward rate than any setting of
a constant criterion (Thura et al., 2012). Thus, we conclude that
during natural, dynamic decisionmaking, the brain does not inte-
grate sensory samples but instead quickly tracks sensory infor-
mation and combines it with a growing urgency signal. It remains
to be seen whether a longer time constant of integration is used
when making decisions in static tasks.
The results shown on Figures 2–4 are compatible with two
recent studies using tasks in which evidence changed over
time. In the monkey, Yang and Shadlen (2007) showed that LIP
activity reflects the sequential information provided by stimulus
cues about which of two saccade targets was the most likely
to yield a reward. Similar to what we found in PMd and M1 (Fig-
ure 3), LIP activity resembled a sigmoidal function of the log
evidence for a choice. Some buildup over time was also
observed, but it was much weaker than what we found here.
This may be due to differences in recording sites and effector
systems or due to the fact that in their study the monkeys were
not allowed to make decisions until the end of the trial, moti-
vating them to keep the urgency signal low.
In the human, Gluth et al. (2012) showed that when subjects
were given sequential information about the value of a hand
response choice, the BOLD signal in motor output regions
combined value information with a signal related to the growing
urgency to respond. The effect of growing urgency was strong,
perhaps because subjects were allowed to respond at any
time, as in our study. This agrees with the proposal (Ditterich,
2006; Standage et al., 2011; Thura et al., 2012) that when an
agent is free to decide at any time, the policy that maximizes
reward rate is to have a decreasing decision criterion, which
can be implemented through a growing urgency signal. Some
studies have suggested that urgency is multiplicatively com-
bined with sensory information (Cisek et al., 2009; Ditterich,
2006; Stanford et al., 2010; Thura et al., 2012), while others
suggest an additive process (Churchland et al., 2008; Gluth
et al., 2012). Here, we found that while some cells showed a
change in both the slope and baseline of their neural response
function over time (Figures 3 and S2), the average population
response was dominated by a baseline shift (Figures 3B and
3D), consistent with an additive urgency.
The proposal of a biased competition in the sensorimotor
system raises the question of what the source of the relevant
biases is. Previous studies implicate the lateral prefrontal cortex
(lPFC) as a major source of task-specific information for action
selection (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Tanji and Hoshi, 2001; Wallis
and Miller, 2003), and it is likely that, in our task, that is the region1412 Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.contributing information about token movements. Indeed, pilot
recordings in lPFC of monkey S showed an effect of sensory
evidence on cell activity (Thura and Cisek, 2010). Buildup activity
resembling our urgency signal has been reported in the supple-
mentary motor areas (Casini and Vidal, 2011; Fried et al., 2011;
Mita et al., 2009) and for oculomotor tasks in LIP (Churchland
et al., 2008; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005; Maimon and Assad,
2006). It is also plausible that all of these regions receive a com-
mon urgency signal from the basal ganglia, which may control
both the timing of action selection as well as the vigor of the
selected movement (Desmurget and Turner, 2010).
Decision Commitment Occurs when the Competition
between Actions Is Resolved
Our results are consistent with a model in which a competition
between movement options is continuously biased by evolving
sensory and urgency signals. In Figures 6 and 7, we observe
themoment at which this competition is resolved, approximately
280 ms prior to movement onset. Here, we refer to this as the
‘‘moment of commitment,’’ although we recognize that such
labels are perforce tentative. At this moment, the activity of
PMd cells tuned to the selected target reaches a peak, while
the activity of M1 cells tuned to the OT is suppressed (Figure 6C).
Approximately 140 ms later, M1 cells tuned to the selected
target also reach their peak of activity. Finally, approximately
another 40 ms later, a peak occurs among M1 cells that are
not significantly tuned during decisions (Figure S6), but which
reflect kinematics of movement and may be involved in initiation
and execution (Kalaska et al., 1989).
The timing of these events is remarkably consistent across trial
types and clearly predicts movement initiation (Figures 6C
and 7B). However, the peak of PMd activity is not simply related
to movement initiation itself. First, it is very early, about 280 ms
before the cursor begins to move, and thus at least 200 ms
before any voluntary muscle contractions. This is close to the
monkey’s total RT in the DR task, a point we will return to later.
Second, when movement is externally instructed in the DR
task, there is no evidence for similar events taking place around
the GO signal (Figure 8). During the DR task, the delay-tuned
PMd population becomes strongly active shortly after cue
presentation (Figure 8C, solid lines), reaching a discharge rate
comparable to its activity at the moment of commitment in the
tokens task (about 25Hz) (Figure 8D, solid lines). However, unlike
in the tokens task, this activity is sustained throughout the delay
period, and at the time of movement onset, it falls to a level
comparable to onset-time activity in the tokens task (16 Hz)
(Figure S8). Similar phenomena are seen in the delay-tuned M1
population. However, when activity is aligned at the time of the
GO signal (middle panels in Figure 8A, 8C, 8E, and 8G), we see
no evidence of task-related activity changes in either area. Inter-
estingly, PMd cells that do not meet the criteria for significant
tuning in the DR task still show similar trends (Figures 8C and
8D, dashed lines), although their activities at movement onset
are not consistent across the tasks.
We propose the following interpretation of these results: To
initiate a movement, the motor system must have committed to
a given option and must not be actively inhibited. In the DR task
(as in previous studies with static decision tasks), the
Neuron
Dynamic Decisions in the Premotor and Motor Cortexcommitment presumably occurs shortly after the presentation of
the cue, but the system is actively inhibited from initiating move-
ment by amechanism that does not involve the cells we recorded
here. Previous studies have suggested that there are no ‘‘omni-
pause’’ neurons in M1 (Kaufman et al., 2013) and that active inhi-
bition of movement initiation may involve spinal mechanisms
(Duque et al., 2010; Prut and Fetz, 1999). In the tokens task,
such active inhibition is not necessary because the monkey is
allowed to respond at any time. Therefore, all that is necessary
tomeet theconditions formovement initiation is that commitment
to a given option is reached. For this reason, in the tokens taskwe
observe a buildup of activity with a clear and brief PMd peak that
predicts movement onset time approximately 280 ms later.
We now return to the question of the timing of this ‘‘moment of
commitment.’’ It precedes movement onset by approximately
280 ms, which is remarkably close to the average RTs in the
DR task (Monkey S: 291 ± 40 ms; Monkey Z: 335 ± 93 ms).
This raises an intriguing quandary: how can the time interval
between the GO signal and movement onset, which presumably
includes both sensory andmotor delays, be similar to the interval
between an internal commitment and movement onset, which
presumably only includes a motor delay? We considered two
possibilities. The first is that in the DR task the monkeys may
have learned to anticipate the timing of the GO signal so well
that, on average, movement initiation begins before the sensory
cue, and so the mean RT is entirely accounted for by pure motor
delays. However, monkeys’ behavior is not consistent with this
explanation. For instance, in monkey S, the distribution of RTs
in the DR task was narrower (SD = 71.2 ms) than the distribution
of latencies between target and movement onsets (SD =
140.6 ms), and there was no trend for the latter to decrease
during training. An alternative explanation is that the motor delay
is longer when commitment is volitional than when it is externally
instructed, as suggested by previous studies. For example, van
Donkelaar et al. (1999) found that the latency between activity in
the motor thalamus and movement onset was often 50–150 ms
longer when actions were internally generated than when they
were visually triggered. Earlier studies by Romo et al. (Romo
et al., 1992; Romo and Schultz, 1992) comparing striatal and
SMA activity during visually versus internally triggered tasks
found that activity in both regions begins long before self-initi-
ated movements. Those authors suggested that self-initiated
movements require reverberating activity within the cortico-
striatal circuit, whose total loop time was estimated at 35–
50 ms. Our findings are in good agreement with this proposal.
If total RT in the DR task is approximately 300 ms and the visual
latency in PMd is approximately 50–80 ms (Cisek and Kalaska,
2005; Ledberg et al., 2007), then the motor delay is about 220–
250 ms. If volitional commitment requires an additional pass
through a cortico-striatal loop, then the delay between commit-
ment in PMd/M1 and movement should be about 255–300ms,
compatible with our estimate of 280 ms. Further research would
be necessary, of course, to test this conjecture.
A Mechanism for Action Choice Formation and
Commitment
All of the results summarized above may be parsimoniously
explained in terms of a class of simple dynamic ‘‘attractor’’models of recurrent competitive networks (Cisek, 2007; Gross-
berg, 1973; Standage et al., 2011; Wang, 2002). In such models,
cells tuned to different options compete through mutual inhibi-
tion, and this competition is biased by various factors. A decision
is said to be made when the activity of one group of cells be-
comes strong enough to suppress the others, and the system
exhibits a phase transition. This event need not involve any
explicit threshold detection mechanism but instead emerges
from the dynamics of the system (Grossberg, 1973). Neverthe-
less, the activity of the winning cells at that moment may be
similar across task conditions and thus appear as a consistent
peak of activity, as in our data.
While our findings contradict the traditional view that all
decision making is a cognitive process taking place in terms of
abstract outcome-related variables (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011), it
should be emphasized that not all decisions are the same. Obvi-
ously, the challenges faced by an animal moving around its envi-
ronment are very different from those faced by an economist
selecting a stock portfolio or a radiologist looking for a tumor.
In particular, during action selection, the choices themselves
are defined by sensory information about the geometric layout
of the environment around the animal, which may be continu-
ously changing, especially if the animal is moving. That informa-
tion influences not just the reward and costs of the potential
actions but also determines whether the decision between
them must be all-or-none or whether a mixture is also an option
(Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011). Because opportunities may be
lost over time, there is no preset level of desired performance but
instead a trade-off between speed and accuracy that may be
achieved through a growing urgency signal (Thura et al., 2012).
Finally, regardless of how the decision unfolds over time, its con-
sequences only begin to play out after an action is taken. Thus,
commitment is only meaningful insofar as an action is initiated.
In summary, when deciding between actions, there are many
reasons why the processes of deliberation and commitment
should take place within the sensorimotor system itself.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects and Apparatus
Twomalemonkeys (Macacamulatta; S was 6 years old and 6 kg; Zwas 4 years
old and 4 kg) were implanted, under anesthesia and aseptic conditions, with a
titanium head-fixation post and recording chambers. Surgery, testing proce-
dure, and animal care were approved by the local animal ethics committee.
Monkeys sat head-fixed in a custom primate chair and performed two planar
reaching tasks using a vertically oriented cordless stylus whose position was
recorded by a digitizing tablet (CalComp, 125 Hz). Their nonacting hand (for
S, left hand for 2 years then right hand for 6 months; for Z, left hand) was
restrained on an arm rest with Velcro bands. In some sessions, unconstrained
eye movements were recorded using an infrared camera (ASL, 120Hz). Stimuli
and continuous cursor feedback were projected onto a mirror suspended
between the monkey’s gaze and the tablet, creating the illusion that they are
in the plane of the tablet. Neural activity was recorded with one to four inde-
pendently moveable (NAN microdrive) microelectrodes (FHC), and data was
acquired with the AlphaLab system (Alpha-Omega Eng.).
Behavioral Tasks
In the ‘‘tokens’’ task (Figure 1A), the monkey is presented with one central
starting circle (1.75 cm radius) and two peripheral target circles (1.75 cm
radius, 180 apart, and 5 cm from the center). Each trial begins when the cursor
is placed in the central circle, in which 15 small tokens are randomly arranged.Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1413
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val), from the center to one of the two targets. Themonkey’s task is tomove the
cursor to the target that he guesses will ultimately receive the majority of
tokens, and he is allowed to make the decision at any time. When the cursor
reaches a target, the remaining tokens move more quickly to their final targets
(‘‘postdecision interval,’’ which was either 50 ms or 150 ms in separate ‘‘fast’’
and ‘‘slow’’ blocks of trials). In the present report, we primarily use data from
the slow blocks (although we also include some fast blocks from monkey Z
early in his experience, while his behavior was statistically indistinguishable
in the two blocks). Once all tokens have jumped, visual feedback is provided
(the chosen target turns green for correct or red for error choices), and a
drop of fruit juice delivered after correct choices.
In the DR task (usually 30–48 trials per session), the monkey again begins by
placing the cursor in the central circle containing the 15 tokens. Next, one of six
peripheral targets is presented (1.75 cm radius, spaced at 60 intervals around
a 5 cm radius circle), and after a variable delay (500 ± 100 ms), the 15 tokens
simultaneously jump into that target. This ‘‘GO signal’’ instructs the monkey to
move the handle to the target to receive a drop of juice.
Neural Recordings
Recording chambers were centered near the arcuate sulcus of the hemisphere
contralateral to the performing hand. Placement was guided using anatomical
MR images (Siemens 3T) coupled with neuro-navigation software (Rogue
Research Inc.). Within each chamber, we used the frontal eye field as a land-
mark, localized as the region where saccades could be evoked by intracortical
microstimulation (40 ms train of 0.2 ms monophasic pulses at 500 Hz) with
current ranging from 50–100 mA (Bruce et al., 1985). During recordings in
PMd and M1, the extracellular signal was amplified (31000) and band-pass
filtered (0.3–3 kHz), and action potentials were isolated on-line using template
matching. This was used to identify task-related cells and estimate their spatial
tuning for target placement. However, all analog waveforms were stored on
disk for subsequent offline sorting using principal components (Plexon), and
all results presented here are based on the offline sorted data. All tasks events,
kinematics, gaze position, and spike times were stored in a database (Micro-
soft SQL) accessed for data analysis via custom-written scripts (Matlab,
Mathworks).
During recording sessions, we focused on cells showing a change of activity
in the tokens task, and monkeys were usually performing the task while we
were searching for cells. When one or more task-related cells were isolated,
we ran a block of 30 to 48 trials of the DR task to determine spatial tuning
and select a PT for each cell (i.e., the target associated with the highest firing
rate during one or more task epochs). Next, we ran blocks of tokens task trials
using the PT of an isolated cell and the 180 OT.We sometimes simultaneously
recorded several task-related cells showing different spatial preferences, and
since we always selected a single pair of targets, the actual best direction for
each of the recorded cells was not always one of these two. Nevertheless,
when comparing activity between the tokens and DR tasks, we always chose
a cell’s ‘‘PT’’ from among the two targets used in the tokens task.
Behavioral Data Analysis
In the tokens task we can calculate, at each moment in time, the success
probability pi(t) associated with choosing each target i. For instance, if at a
particular moment in time the right target contains NR tokens, whereas the
left contains NL tokens, and there are NC tokens remaining in the center,
then the probability that the target on the right will ultimately be the correct
one (i.e., the success probability of guessing right) is the following:
pðRjNR;NL;NCÞ=NC!
2NC
XminðNC ;7NLÞ
k = 0
1
k!ðNC  kÞ!: (Equation 1)
Calculating this quantity for the 15 token jumps allows us to construct
the success probability profile pi(t) associated with each trial (Figure 1B).
Although each token jump and each trial was completely random, we could
classify a posteriori some specific classes of trials embedded in the fully
random sequence (e.g., ‘‘easy,’’ ‘‘ambiguous,’’ and ‘‘misleading’’ trials)
(Figure 1C).1414 Neuron 81, 1401–1416, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.We focus behavioral analyses on three variables: DT, SPD, and ‘‘confi-
dence’’ at DT. To estimate the DT, we first detect the time of movement onset
(based on analysis of kinematics; see Pastor-Bernier et al., 2012) and subtract
from this the monkey’s mRT in the DR task on the same day. We then use
Equation 1 to compute for each trial the SPD (Figure 1B).
Calculation of the monkey’s confidence at DT is based on the available
sensory evidence favoring the chosen target at the time of the decision. We
do not believe that monkeys can calculate Equation 1, but we expect that
they canmake a reasonable estimate.We thus computed a simple approxima-
tion of sensory evidence as the sum of log likelihood ratios (SumLogLR) of
individual token movements (see Cisek et al., 2009 for more details), which
is proportional to the difference in the number of tokens present in each target.
Neural Data Analysis
All neurophysiological data reported here were acquired from correct or error
trials in which the monkeys completed the tokens task by choosing one of the
two targets. Neurons were selected according to their anatomical location and
physiological properties. Among all cells recorded in PMd and M1, we focus
here on those showing a significant spatial preference for one of the targets
during the deliberation process (i.e., between the first token jump and our
estimate of DT). For each cell, we calculated the mean activity for each target
choice during the 200 ms preceding DT in the tokens task and assessed the
significance using a receiver-operating characteristic analysis with a criterion
of 0.65.
Instantaneous firing rate was assessed via a partial interspike interval
method. When analyzing data with respect to the start of the trial (first token
jump), we usually exclude all spikes occurring after our estimate of DT, thus
precluding any activity associated with movement initiation and/or execution.
This is important in order to prevent averaging artifacts due to the very wide
range of DTs in the tokens task. KS tests were used to compare activity distri-
butions. Spearman’s rank test was used to assess significance of the relation-
ship between SumLogLR and neural activity. We determined the moment that
a cell discriminated between PT and OT when the difference of activity
exceeded two SDs (computed from baseline) in a 10 ms sliding window with
a 2 ms step size (Sato and Schall, 2003). To be included in our analyses, cells
had to have been recorded during at least four trials in each tested condition.
The significance level of all statistical tests was set at 0.05.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes eight figures and can be found with this
article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2014.01.031.
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